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How Come We Know? 
The Media Coverage of Economic Inequality 
 
ANDREA GRISOLD 
HENDRIK THEINE1 
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria 
 
Given the background of rising economic inequalities, the topic has reentered the field of 
economic science. Yet the problem of how economic inequality is being mediated to the 
public is not discussed in economics at all, and hardly mentioned in communication 
studies. Through an analysis of recent empirical studies on the coverage of inequality in 
the media, we debate the role mass media play as information providers. Assessing the 
underlying assumptions and the methodological approaches guiding the respective 
empirical findings, we can highlight the merits of this body of work and identify open 
questions for further research. The last part of the article provides a discussion of 
(currently rather neglected) political economy theories that offer rich theoretical 
approaches to study media, power, and inequality.  
 
Keywords: media coverage, economic inequality, redistributional policies, preference 
shaping, critical political economy of the media 
 
 
After decades of benign neglect, the issues of economic and social inequalities have only recently 
reentered the stage of mainstream political attention and debate. The fact is that low-income households 
are confronted with declining or stagnant incomes, policy regimes are orientated toward austerity, and 
high rates of unemployment prevail in most parts of Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. This can be 
traced back to the increasing financialization of economies, which has been accompanied by a shift in the 
power relations between capital and labor dating from the early 1980s. Not least, this is connected to the 
relative decline of the real economy in contrast to the financial economy, resulting in a smaller 
remuneration to labor, the decline of the wage ratio, and the rise of inequality. A global, market-radical 
counterreformation led to massive social splits, the rise of the working poor, and other marginalized 
groups in rich countries as well as a much-discussed relative decline of the middle class.  
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On the other high-end side of the income distribution, a new generation of economic elites has 
emerged. In contrast to the age of Fordism, which privileged the goal of a major expansion if not 
universalization of the middle class, neoliberalism times are orientated toward a polarization of income 
and material welfare between the top layers and the majority below. Not only did the income gap widen 
over the last decades, wealth inequality is increasing as well (Piketty, 2014; Reich, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012). 
Against this background, it may come as no surprise that the book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, by 
the French economist Thomas Piketty, became such a bestseller and media event in 2014 and 2015.2 
 
Notwithstanding the rediscovery of the inequality topic by economists as well as other social 
scientists, little is known on how economic inequality is being mediated to the public. That is exactly 
where this article steps in: To give a systematic overview of the existing empirical studies on the media 
coverage of economic inequality and to offer an embedding of these findings in a theoretical context. The 
article is structured as follows: After an introduction into the debate on economic inequality, we continue 
by discussing the relevance of the mediation of economic inequality for economic policies. Drawing on an 
overview of recent studies, which empirically examine the coverage of inequality and redistributional 
policies, we debate the role that mass media play as information providers. Acknowledging that scholars 
adopting a political economy approach frequently engage with issues on inequality, we finish off by turning 
to this research tradition for theories and insights that may help us to better comprehend how economic 
inequality is contextualized in the mass media. 
 
In our understanding, the mass media now play an indispensable role for the creation and 
dissemination of ideas and opinions related to economic processes and their material outcomes, be it for 
the knowledge and acceptance of public policy options or the results of scientific research. In a broader 
context, the question is how do people acquire their knowledge about economic processes and affairs that 
they are not, or only indirectly, part of. In other words: How come we know? And why is this of 
importance to both communication studies and economics? 
 
Economic Inequality and Its Mediation 
 
In this section, we set the scene for our topic of the mediation of economic inequality.3 We review 
and address key trends and drivers of the rising wealth and income inequality in the section titled 
Economic Inequality: A Rediscovered Subject, look at the scientific division of labor between 
communication science and economics in the section titled On the Crossroads of Communication Science 
and Economics, highlight the economic concept of preferences in its importance for the mediation of 
economic inequality in the section titled A Detour Into Economics: The Shaping of Preferences, and finish 
with an outlook of what the empirical studies reviewed in this article conclude on the latter topic in the 
section titled Empirical Research on Economic Inequality and Related Topics. 
 
                                                 
2 See Wade (2014) for a discussion of the “Piketty phenomenon,” and Grisold, Preston, Silke, and Theine 
(2015) for an ongoing research project on the topic. 
3 In this article, we use the term economic inequality as a general term for income and wealth inequality. 
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Economic Inequality: A Rediscovered Subject 
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a group of social scientists gained renewed interest in 
long-term trends of wealth and income inequality, which led to the publication of a growing number of 
scientific books and articles (see Piketty & Saez, 2014, for an overview). Probably the most well-known 
books published recently by economists are Thomas Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 
Anthony Atkinson’s (2015) Inequality: What Can Be Done?, and Branko Milanovic’s (2016) Global 
Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. Three major themes can be identified from this 
growing body of literature as most essential for the purpose of this article: the long-term study of wealth 
and income inequality as well as the importance of political processes for both.  
 
The first finding from the literature is that there have been major changes in the distribution of 
income over the past century. Just before World War I, the income share of the top decile4 was around 
50% in most European countries and slightly lower in the United States. From there on, income inequality 
decreased in Europe and the U.S. to around 30% of total income going to the top decile in the 1950s and 
1960s. Thus, income inequality was rather modest after World War II. Since the 1980s, income inequality 
increased again; the high-income groups (i.e., top 10%, 1%, and 0.1%) have been gaining momentum 
over the past decades, leaving behind the lower ones. In the U.S. this trend is most pronounced, where 
the top 10% of income holders were able to boost their income shares from 30% to 35% at the end of the 
1970s to nearly 50% in the early 2010s. The steep increases in the U.S. are predominantly due to the 
“Rise of the Supermanagers” (Piketty, 2014, p. 315), a process where managers and CEOs were able to 
raise their incomes significantly. This led The Economist (“Forget the 1%,” 2014) to state the following: 
“Forget the 1%, It is the 0.01% who are really getting ahead in America” (para. 1). Similar patterns can 
be found in other Anglo-Saxon regions, such as Great Britain. In continental Europe, income inequality 
also increased, yet “merely” from around 30% in 1950 to about 35% in 2010 (Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 
2011; Piketty, 2014; Piketty & Saez, 2014).  
 
For the long-term evolution of wealth distribution, the second central finding of recent literature, 
large-scale changes can be observed accordingly.5 Yet there is an important difference: Wealth inequality 
is much higher than income inequality throughout the 20th and 21st century. While the top deciles’ 
income share ranges between 30% and 50%, their wealth share is between 60% and 90%. The central 
reason for this difference is that although the bottom half of the population earns considerable income, it 
holds almost no wealth at all. Apart from that, wealth concentration went through a similar trend. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, the top 10% of wealth owners held around 90% of overall wealth in Europe 
and slightly less in the United States. This concentration of wealth fell rapidly to around 60% in the 1950s. 
                                                 
4 The share of the top decile in overall income and/or wealth is the standard measure used by this strand 
of literature. It measures the “size of the cake,” which is held by the top 10% of the population. In the 
following, we will refer to this measure when discussing the concentration of wealth and income. 
5 Remarkably, such figures only account for wealth that is disclosed to the tax authorities. Including 
wealth hidden in tax havens (that do not show up in official records) enhance actual wealth inequality 
significantly (Zucman, 2014). 
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Since the 1980s, concentration is on the rise again and reached national levels of 65% in Europe and of 
70% in the U.S. (Piketty, 2014; Piketty & Zucman, 2015).  
 
Particularly, Piketty (2014) stresses that societies with extreme income and wealth 
concentrations define social status depending on wealth and inheritance rather than on personal work and 
individual achievements. Ever increasing and extreme hyper concentrations of inequality undermine the 
legitimacy of the prevailing forms of liberal democracy as well as attendant meritocratic principles 
(Piketty, 2014). 
 
The third major feature of recent inequality literature is “that economic trends are not acts of 
God, and that country-specific institutions and historical circumstances can lead to very different 
inequality outcomes” (Piketty & Saez, 2014, p. 838). Stated differently, the magnitude of wealth and 
income concentration is by no means dependent on quasinatural economic laws or inevitable 
developments, but is largely influenced by political processes, different forms and levels of taxation, as 
well as period-specific zeitgeists. Hence, this literature emphasizes the role of government regulation for 
the distribution of wealth and income (Atkinson, 2015; Milanovic, 2016; Piketty, 2014; Piketty & Saez, 
2014). In brief, Piketty (2014) proposes to reinforce substantially higher taxes on income and wealth, 
Atkinson (2015) makes similar policy recommendations for the UK, and Milanovic (2016) reflects on 
policies related to global inequality.  
 
On the Crossroads of Communication Science and Economics 
 
Although concerns about economic inequality have reentered the field of economic science, as 
manifest in some major publications in recent years, the issue of how topics on economic inequality are 
mediated (to the public) is not being addressed in economics at all. In contrast, in the field of media and 
communication studies, “issues to do with economic, class or related social inequalities (other than specific 
conceptualizations of gender, race and sexual orientation) do not feature prominently” (Preston, 2016, p. 38). 
 
This lack of research is highly significant because, in the contemporary social context, the media 
are an important and influential source of information on inequality topics, as the full range of economic 
inequality is not assessable through everyday life experiences. Thus, the media are able to frame and 
shape the understanding of inequality and the related redistributional policies by selecting, arranging, and 
presenting certain types of information. Inevitably, some interpretations are highlighted while others are 
suppressed or ignored, therewith constructing reality. In doing so, different media outlets have the power 
to actively shape public discourse. For the issues at stake, this implies that the media play an 
indispensable role for the spreading of information as well as for the understanding and acceptance of 
public policies to alter economic inequality.  
 
A Detour Into Economics: The Shaping of Preferences 
 
“Whatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world in which we live, we know 
through the mass media”—this often-cited introductory statement by the renowned German sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann to one of his last books, published in 1996, highlights that one important source of the 
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ideas and symbols that people use to interpret the world is provided by and fueled through mass media. 
Yet this incidental importance of the media has been ignored by economists so far. Driven by the intention 
to conceive of individuals as independent units (think of Hobbes’s mushroom metaphor), economic theory 
in its mainstream version never even raised the target of how and in what ways preferences are shaped. 
Neoclassical economists regard preferences as being exogenous, thus indicating they are not shaped within 
the economic system, but somehow formed in an independent way (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). The 
dogma of exogenous preferences not only affects economic policy (as a higher degree of endogenous 
preferences would call for more active economic policies) but also its instruments (Tsakalotos, 2004). 
 
In any serious analysis dealing with the interdependencies between economics and the media, 
the contested sphere of preference shaping must not be neglected. Be it the keeping up with the Joneses, 
conformity or imitation, or political opinions: All those elements in the formation of preferences are 
endogenous ones, and they are influenced by mass media in a considerable way. Heterodox economists 
such as Bowles (1998) identify social interaction as the decisive criterion of the endogenous formation of 
preferences, but still do not refer at all to the role of mass media (Grisold, 2004). More recent heterodox 
economic literature attempts to incorporate endogenous preferences and focusses on how incentives 
through public policies have an impact on habits, preferences, and beliefs (Bowles, 2008; Bowles & 
Polania-Reyes, 2012; Gintis & Romer, 1998). We advocate the reverse causality by arguing that the 
shaping of preferences through media coverage gains comparable importance for the acceptance, 
introduction, or the change of economic public policies. 
 
In this article we aim to shed light on the role of media for the case of inequality issues and 
redistributional policies (i.e., the shaping of “inequality preferences”).6 For the focus of this article, it is 
important to understand that preferences are affected through media coverage, as the treatment of 
inequality in mass media (economic news reporting) surely has impacts on the perception of public 
policies, such as redistributional policies.  
 
Empirical Research on Economic Inequality and Related Topics 
 
“The relationship between media consumption and perceptions of inequality is virtually unaddressed 
in the extant literature” (Friedland, Rojas, & Bode, 2012, p. 288). As mentioned before, we know little about 
the role of media in mediating economic inequality. Yet there is a substantially larger literature on economic 
news reporting from which we can potentially draw first insights on the mediation of economic inequality. In 
the following section we will give a cursory overview of the media coverage of economic topics. We 
concentrate on issues and insights that seem relevant for the mediation of economic inequality and thus 
serve as an important basis for a deeper understanding. In the section on Intermediaries for the Topic of 
Economic Inequality, we turn to the review of empirical studies on the mediation of economic inequality as 
well as redistribution policies (e.g., welfare programs or wealth taxes). 
                                                 
6 There is a body of literature (mainly from economics and political sciences) using sociodemographic data 
to explain preferences for redistributional policies (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Corneo & Grüner, 2002). 
As they neither engage with endogenous preferences nor include the media, we deliberately exclude them 
in our analysis.  
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Mass Media as Intermediaries for Economic Topics 
 
The core understanding of empirical studies on the subject is that news coverage on economic 
topics clearly effects the perception and understanding of economic issues. This general insight has been 
investigated for different dimensions of the economy. Even more so, existing studies on the role of media 
in reporting economic trends have, as Schiffrin (2015) puts it, a “critical flavor” (p. 642) as they question 
the media’s “watchdog” function as an independent, informing observer.  
 
First, scholars have stressed that business and financial news coverage tends to be framed 
around or is “captured” by promarket explanations (Mayher & Mcdonald, 2007; Phelan, 2007a, 2007b; 
Robertson, 2010). Stories do not “question the overarching economic philosophy of free-market 
capitalism” (Robertson, 2010, p. 526). Moreover, the voices of employer’s groups and political parties are 
relatively overrepresented compared with employee interests and disadvantaged groups. 
 
This promarket focus leads to an overemphasis on business news and detailed stock market 
information, leaving aside stories of “ordinary people” and the neglect of nonelite problems and working-
class perspectives (Kollmeyer, 2004; Usher, 2012). In the words of Herbert Gans (2014), “the mass news 
media have largely avoided—and still avoid—most economic news relevant to the mass audience” (p. 
2485). Journalists, in this view, share common standpoints with economic elites on corporate interests 
and the economic social order (Kollmeyer, 2004; Schiffrin, 2015). This has continued in the wake of the 
economic crisis since 2008, as noted by other social scientists (see Schiffrin, 2015, for an overview).  
 
Media scholars have identified organizational and structural changes in the field of journalism that 
reinforce the promarket perspective. Business and financial journalism faces rising complexity of financial 
instruments and products exceeding the expertise of specialized journalists. In addition, pressure of 
productivity due to intensification of speed and availability of information increased, paralleled by a 
significant decline in journalists, which often leads to a narrow consideration of established sources. This is 
further intensified by the growth of public relations, sponsorship, and other subsidized information flows 
favoring wealth and powerful interests (e.g., Davis, 2007; Gandy, 2015; Preston, 2009; Tambini, 2010). 
 
Second, media coverage of economic news has been discussed by several scholars as often 
“bear[ing] no relationship with economic reality” (Shen, 2009, p. 382), meaning that economic news 
coverage does not coincide with actual economic trends. Empirical proofs are (a) a rise in unemployment 
is reported more often than a rise in inflation (Fogarty, 2005), (b) the coverage of unemployment and 
public debt regularly deviates from actual developments (Mosley, 1984), (c) or the fact that 
psychologically important thresholds (e.g., 4 million unemployed in Germany) coincide with coverage 
peaks (Quiring, 2003), even though this might just be the result of small increases. Furthermore, 
coverage of rising unemployment are found more often than that of falling rates, leading Garz (2014) to 
suspect, “maybe because bad news sells better than no news” (p. 510).  
 
Third, we find a decent body of literature dealing with issues related to inequality, namely, the 
long-standing tradition of critical analyses that focuses on the media representations of poverty and “the 
poor.” Bullock, Fraser, and Williams (2001), in their extensive survey on media images of the poor, 
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document the “prevalence of classist, racist, and sexist assumptions in media depictions of welfare 
recipients” (p. 236), which has been empirically confirmed by Redden (2011), Erler (2012), and Chauhan 
and Foster (2014), yet contested by El-Burki, Porpora, and Reynolds (2016). 
 
A dominant frame discussed by Entman (1995) is that poverty is portrayed as a source of threat 
for the community linking poor to criminality, drug addiction, and alcoholism, thus reinforcing 
stereotypical representations of the poor. Poor are portrayed in connection to bad parenting techniques, 
immoral and self-inflicted single motherhood, as well as unhealthy diets. News covering poverty are 
framed in an episodic rather than a thematic way, highlighting the responsibility of the individual rather 
than the collective. Structural reasons for poverty are sidelined by placing the responsibility on the 
individual (Chauhan & Foster, 2014; Gilens, 1996; Iyengar, 1990; Redden, 2011). What has been 
concluded by Bullock et al. in 2001 seems to hold true these days as well: “Framing techniques that 
present poverty as an individual problem rather than a societal issue rooted in economic and political 
inequality further reinforce the perceived undeservingness of the poor” (p. 237). 
 
Intermediaries for the Topic of Economic Inequality 
 
We are confronted with a situation where new developments, due to escalating economic 
inequalities, tend to be “greeted by ‘significant silences’ by much of the communication, media and 
journalism studies fields” (Preston, 2016, p. 52). Our starting point to address this silence is to provide an 
overview and summary of published empirical work on the coverage of inequality, therewith analyzing 
existing research in this field. Our focus lies on journal articles in German and English, published from 
2000 onwards,7 which empirically examine the coverage of inequality and redistributional policies.8 A 
literature review within the relevant social science disciplines was conducted, making use of different 
search engines (e.g., Web of Science, Google Scholar) and a variety (and combination) of key words (e.g., 
mediation, economic inequality, media coverage, inequality, redistributional policies, discourse).  
 
The first striking fact is that we found only 11 articles that matched our criteria. The articles differ 
in terms of the analyzed corpus as well as the empirical method. Several articles use larger data sets and 
employ quantitative methods to cover long time periods or larger bodies of text. Other articles focus on a 
smaller corpus and make use of qualitative methods. The long-term analyses tend to focus on quantitative 
analysis of inequality coverage (i.e., the frequency of occurrence of the word inequality and related terms). 
Articles that investigate specific policy debates (on wealth taxes and welfare recipients) make use of a variety 
of methods, that is, critical discourse analysis and framing analysis, and sometimes a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods is pursued. In the following, we provide a summary of the existing research. 
 
                                                 
7 After a review of the articles, we decided to include De Goede (1996), as it is both a substantial 
contribution in terms of methodology as well as a frequently cited piece of evidence.  
8 Even though Corneo (2006) and Petrova (2008) are concerned with inequality, we did not include them 
in the review, as both do not fit our focus: The former develops a formal model on economic inequality 
and media capture, whereas the latter empirically examines the relationship between income inequality 
and freedom of the press. 
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Long-Term Coverage of Inequality 
 
Schröder and Vietze (2015) and Petring (2016) investigated the long-term evolution of media 
coverage on inequality for German newspapers. Schröder and Vietze (2015) analyzed the long-term media 
coverage of economic inequality for three major German newspapers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die 
Zeit, and Spiegel). Between 1946 and 2015, they found an increase in news coverage of economic 
inequality in all newspapers. Yet the three newspapers differ in terms of magnitudes: Die Zeit is the most 
active in coverage of inequality, followed by Spiegel. In contrast, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reports 
the least on such issues, and its coverage also increased only slightly.  
 
This finding is partly supported by Petring (2016), who analyzed the long-term coverage of 
economic inequality in the newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1959–2011), Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(1992–2011) and Die Tageszeitung (1987–2011). Their striking finding is that for all newspapers except 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung coverage of inequality topics increased in accordance with the 
development of the respective (economic) indicators (e.g., Gini coefficient),9 which the authors interpreted 
as news coverage coinciding with actual developments. The above findings coincide with the political 
orientation of the papers examined: The conservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung did not 
increase its coverage, whereas Spiegel, Die Zeit, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Die Tageszeitung (all rather 
left, left-liberal outlets) increased their coverage of economic inequality. 
 
However, as acknowledged by the authors, and an important methodological argument for the 
authors of this article as well, the study is built around a quantitative approach, which restricts their 
analysis to word counting. This neglects the social meaning behind words as well as the normative context 
in which they are embedded. Yet the sense, meaning, and framing given to specific words and concepts is 
a central cornerstone of media reporting.  
 
For other countries, no studies with such a long-term focus were found. A slightly comparable 
study for the U.S. was conducted by O. H. Gandy (2007). He analyzed the media coverage of inequality 
between 1980 and 2000 in The New York Times and The Washington Post, two outlets of—in his words—
”elite media.” In both newspapers, he investigated (through headlines and lead paragraphs) whether the 
articles discussed inequality as their primary focus. In a second step, the articles were categorized 
according to the type of inequality (race, gender, disparity) they focused on. Over time, both newspapers 
issued more stories on health disparities and racial inequalities, whereas the coverage of economic 
inequality decreased.  
 
A rather short-term analysis was conducted by Champlin and Knoedler (2008), who examine the 
media coverage of the middle class in the United States between 1997 and 2002. Newspaper indexes on 
inequality show that approximately twice as many articles were published on this topic between 2002 and 
2007 compared with the 1997 to 2002 period in six major newspapers (The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times). Yet, in 
                                                 
9 The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure typically used to quantify the inequality of income and wealth 
within a society.  
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spite of the increase, Champlin and Knoedler (2008) argued that “the emphasis in most cases is limited to 
a simple reporting of the existence of growing inequality and middle class decline” (p. 136). 
 
Coverage of Wealth Taxes 
 
The framing of specific policies and policy debates aiming to gasp the social meaning of 
discourses is the focus of another set of studies. Bell and Entman (2011) as well as Limbert and Bullock 
(2009) scrutinized the media representation of tax cuts during the Bush administration in 2001 and 2003. 
Mainly wealthy taxpayers benefited from the tax reform due to tax cuts in the top rate as well as lower 
taxes on dividends and capital gains. Bell and Entman (2011) draw on a framing analysis as well as 
quantitative and qualitative text analyses of three major national television news broadcasts (ABC World 
News Tonight, CBS Evening News, and NBC Nightly News). They found that two thirds of media coverage 
on the tax reform are framed in “collectivistic,” undefined terms as “all Americans” would receive tax cuts 
or eventually benefit from reduced tax burdens, “implying that everyone in America shared similar 
interests in tax policy” (Bell & Entman, 2011, p. 556). Furthermore, news stories predicted that tax cuts 
would stimulate economic growth, whereas almost no attention was paid to the detrimental impact on the 
federal budget. 
 
Limbert and Bullock (2009) used a critical discourse analysis approach to analyze the media 
discourse on the same tax reform, but focused on five major U.S. newspapers (USA Today, The Wall 
Street Journal, The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post). Tax cuts, they note, were 
repeatedly discussed as an important contribution to the economic well-being of the country, thus, 
portraying tax cuts as “an issue of general concern rather than as a policy that would primarily benefit the 
wealthy” (Limbert & Bullock, 2009, p. 71). Meritocratic ideals were upheld as individuals benefitting from 
tax reductions were constructed as hard earners deserving to keep their own money. Another prominent 
theme was a very class-specific concept of double taxation, that is, a highly selective concern that 
shareholder’s money is taxed twice, once as taxes on corporate profits and second as the stockholder’s 
income, which was often described as unfair. When social groups were mentioned, senior citizens were 
often portrayed as benefitting from tax cuts and thus being able to enhance their modest incomes.  
 
Both studies likewise conclude that an inequality perspective (wealthy people were benefiting 
because only they hold considerable company shares) was largely lacking: “So although tax policy can be 
used to protect the United States from too much inequality that connection was conspicuously absent from 
the 2001 and 2003 broadcast news” (Bell & Entman, 2011, p. 561). Likewise, Limbert and Bullock (2009) 
conclude that “the use of ‘neutral’ language in articles about the Bush administration’s dividend tax 
initiatives obscured the racial implications of the cuts, diverting attention from the relationship between 
tax policies and structural inequality” (p. 73). 
 
For the German case, Lichtenstein, Rhomberg, and Böhme (2016) analyzed the framing of the 
wealth tax debate before the national elections in 2013 in the newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Die Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit, Spiegel Online and BILD Online. The dominant frame in which 
wealth tax was discussed in all media outlets was “economic consequences,” meaning that the focus of the 
debate was centered on the potential negative consequences for the economy. Furthermore, some 
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variations characterize the different outlets: Social justice considerations were more important in left-
liberal newspapers whereas “economic” arguments were particularly prominent among conservative 
newspapers.  
 
Coverage of Welfare Reform 
 
Papers that analyze the media coverage of welfare reform show that cutbacks of social benefits 
are represented as successful policies that reduce the dependence on governmental support while 
increasing self-reliance and autonomy (Lens, 2002), giving little explanation for structural causes of 
poverty and welfare dependence (Limbert & Bullock, 2009). Although several articles objected to the 
proposed welfare reform, the individualization scheme was not questioned. Harkins and Lugo-Ocando 
(2016) argue that this Malthusian understanding of poverty (focusing on recourse scarcity instead of 
highlighting the unequal distribution of wealth) originates in the Victorian age, and was reinforced by the 
breakdown of welfare discourse in the UK in the 1970s. 
 
Considering the ideological positions, conservative media and even media considered center left 
(e.g., Newsweek, in De Goede, 1996; The New York Times and The Washington Post, in Lens, 2002) have 
prevalent conservative framings: Welfare recipients are stereotyped as passive, irresponsible, and lazy, 
“as individually dysfunctional” (Lens, 2002, p. 6), with poor work ethics. They are constructed as “others,” 
a classical form of “distancing” (Harkins & Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Limbert & Bullock, 2009). 
 
Coverage of Executive Pay 
 
As mentioned, an important driver of income inequality is the rise of executive pay at the very 
upper level of income distribution (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014). Yet there is hardly any work on the 
reporting of such developments. As an exception, Thomas (2016) analyzed the coverage on remuneration of 
Barclay’s executives in 2012: Several shareholders opposed the company’s executive pay package and 
attempted to vote it down, which led news coverage by several newspapers and TV broadcasters. Thomas 
(2016) made use of critical discourse analysis to investigate three different broadcast reports by ITV, SKY, 
and BBC on this event. All three reports frame the shareholder vote within a strong conflict frame, where the 
opposing shareholders were constructed as rebels. In contrast, the executives were shown dining and 
drinking wine and thus constructed as excessive. Thereby the complex nature of executive pay and diversity 
of shareholders was profoundly simplified, and wider themes and issues around capitalist structures and 
dynamics were ignored. Hence, “these three broadcasters have missed the opportunity to nuance concepts 
of austerity, shareholder agency and inequality, and so have some distance to travel in order to move 
beyond simple notions of ‘fat cats’ and protest” (Thomas, 2016, p. 111). 
 
Conclusions: What Do We Learn From the Review of Empirical Studies? 
 
In summarizing, we find that the long-term quantitative studies (conducted particularly for 
Germany) show a compatibility between the rise of inequality on the one hand and an increased coverage 
in the media on the other (Petring, 2016; Schröder & Vietze, 2015). Yet the mere increase of coverage 
tells little about the way inequality is mediated. In line with the findings by Champlin and Knoedler 
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(2008), one can conclude that media outlets in the U.S. only display the problem of inequality rather than 
attempting to offer solutions or detailed context.10 Thus, mediating the issues of inequality to the public is 
done in a strictly one-dimensional way—obfuscating as much as telling a story. Several scholars conclude 
that on the respective incidents, media reports do not provide their audience with information needed to 
understand and evaluate the developments of rising inequality. This poses fundamental questions about 
the media’s much-cited watchdog role.  
 
The research conducted on specific policies and policy debates adds to the picture by 
exemplifying that the framing of inequality matters. The coverage of tax reform is largely framed in 
collectivistic terms, implying that the entire population benefits from tax cuts directly or indirectly through 
increased growth (Bell & Entman, 2011; Limbert & Bullock, 2009). While the coverage on tax reform failed 
to distinguish between (potential) losers and winners therefrom, meritocratic ideals were prominently 
endorsed by constructing individuals that benefit from tax reductions as hard earners. In contrast, wealth 
taxes were framed as potentially negative for the overall economy, implying detrimental effects for the 
entire population (Lichtenstein et al., 2016). In a similar vein, welfare recipients were constructed as 
individually responsible for their dependence on government programs, giving little explanation for structural 
causes of poverty and welfare dependence (De Goede, 1996; Harkins & Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Lens, 2002; 
Limbert & Bullock, 2009). The same applies to the reporting on executive remuneration: Although it is a 
central driver of income inequality, media coverage sticks to simple frames of conflict and excess and fails to 
contextualize executive pay into the wider developments of rising inequality (Thomas, 2016). 
 
The Theoretical Context: Critical Political Economy of the Media 
 
We have seen that empirical research on the mediation of economic inequality may be limited in 
scope, but it points to dramatic conclusions. In light of these findings we have to ask how such framings 
come about. This involves taking a close look at ownership, (hegemonic) structure(s), and means of 
control as well as legitimation and ideology within the media and communication system, all of which lie at 
the core of the epistemological interest for authors engaged in the critical political economy of the media 
(CPEoM).11 This approach has long been concerned with inequalities in society and how these are reflected 
and/or perpetuated by communication structures, including the media’s role in reinforcing or undermining 
political and social inequality (McChesney, 2008). Relevant studies also analyze power relations in the 
media sector and assess changing levels of concentration and their negative consequences (Bagdikian, 
2004; Gandy, 1992; Herman & McChesney, 1997). For radical scholars like Dallas Smythe or Herbert 
Schiller, the lack of attention to unbalanced, asymmetric power in the media results in pervasive support 
for the interests of the powerful (Babe, 1995). So it might not come as a surprise that the positive impact 
on redistributional policies are underrepresented in media coverage. 
 
This is perfectly in line with our research goal, and, correspondingly, a robust understanding of 
the formation of media requires researchers to address how content is “produced and distributed in a 
given society and how it is situated in relation to the dominant structure” (Kellner, 2009, p. 96). In the 
                                                 
10 In a conceptual way, this has been emphasized by O. Gandy (2015). 
11 For an overview, see Golding and Murdock (1997) or Hardy (2014).  
4276  Andrea Grisold and Hendrik Theine International Journal of Communication 11(2017) 
following section, we therefore draw on the CPEoM approach to identify reasons for the aforementioned 
empirical unbalance in the media coverage of inequality. 
 
Media Market Structures: Ownership, Concentration, Advertising 
 
Political economists consider ownership an essential part in the overall context of the analysis of 
mass media. Garnham (1990) may be cited as a prominent example who criticized the neoliberal 
deregulation approach to information technologies, the media, and the cultural sphere. In the neoliberals’ 
worldview, the new era of cultural freedom would lead to diversity in cultural production and information 
equally accessible to everyone—an argument, dating from the 1980s, that sounds quite familiar these 
days, thanks to the protagonists of a new-media/Internet-freedom approach.  
 
And yet an ever-increasing process of concentration on a global scale can be observed across 
both the “mature” and “new” media industries. This holds true for different forms of concentration over 
the past decades: ownership, markets for input factors, advertising, and (mainly for newspapers) numbers 
of titles published (Bagdikian, 2004; Fuchs, 2015; Herman & McChesney, 1997). And the concentration 
process continues even more with new forms of (social) media, be it Facebook or Google, to name just the 
most powerful ones. This is anything but a new phenomenon, but one that gains increasing momentum in 
times of deregulation. It can be alleviated by regulation policies unless we arrive—as market 
fundamentalists do—at the conclusion that concentration is being triggered by regulatory measures 
themselves. Strongly opposed to this position, Grisold (2004, 2015) has shown in earlier works that 
regulation via market forces itself encourages concentration.  
 
Other scholars in the field of political economy of communication add that the media are 
increasingly under commercial pressure, which leads to fewer detailed and investigative stories simply 
because less money is available. The fact that media outlets are dependent on advertising and the trend 
of more concentration of media ownership further adds to the compelling conclusion that business and 
economic journalism remains prone to probusiness reporting and elite framings of economic news 
(Champlin & Knoedler, 2008; McChesney, 2003, 2012; Thomas, 2016). 
 
Privatization Versus the Public 
 
The phenomenon of ever-growing privatization of the media sector (e.g., in broadcasting 
markets) is a further relevant topic that has been critically addressed by James Carey (1994), among 
others. His conclusion is that an overall liberalization satisfies individual, though not collective, 
preferences. The fragmented structure of private production results in a fragmentation of the public 
sphere and fosters a methodological individualism, while common policies or traditions tend to diminish 
and disappear. Although the critiques of such trends date back to the mid-1990s, they are even more 
pertinent today. This fact is emphasized in some recent literature on media coverage of inequality, such as 
Champlin and Knoedler (2008) or Bell and Entman (2011), who also address the distinction between 
individual and collective preferences. 
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Furthermore, Champlin and Knoedler (2008) conceptualize media as the main intermediary 
between economic processes and the informing or shaping of public opinion on inequality. Yet due to the 
economic setup of media outlets, primarily as pecuniary businesses oriented to selling what sells best, 
they only have a subordinate interest in citizens’ education. In such a context, “the quantity and content 
of the news supplied by the mainstream press has been tilted toward news that is sensationalistic, ratings-
enhancing, and cheaply produced” (Champlin & Knoedler, 2008, p. 144). This has important implications 
for the reporting on economic inequality: As a rather unprofitable topic, it seldom features prominent 
coverage, or it is, due to its research-intense nature, covered by relying heavily on readymade 
information, often provided by (right-wing) think tanks. 
 
The control of information manifests through different channels, but finds similar results: the 
public being deprived of information, respectively, the information provided being filtered along certain 
lines. Those types of control may be realized through concentration in ownership (Bagdikian, 2004) but 
also through upstream information providers (Grisold, 2004). 
 
One key factor in the process of information control, according to CPEoM, is the degree of 
marketization of information (Schiller, 1988). Thus, the reconceptualization of information as a public 
good, not a commodity, is essential for opening up potential solutions either by means of noncommercial 
media, or, as some argue, by public-service broadcasting. Here is not the context to discuss the 
drawbacks experienced in both forms; our argument is solely that they can compensate the lack of 
information as a public good, at least partially. 
 
Manufacturing Consent 
 
In their much-cited Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky (1988) analyzed the structures 
of information mediation as exemplified by the coverage of selected political events by U.S. mass media, and 
drew attention to the propaganda function of such information processing. Institutions holding political or 
economic power, mass media, the advertising industry, and others: All of them produce—to their mutual 
benefit—a form of universal consensus that constitutes, in an ideal way, hegemony.12 
 
In their assessment of the welfare debate, Limbert and Bullock (2009) take up the propaganda 
model to contextualize the reporting on prorich tax reforms. They argue that “the ‘manufacturing’ of 
consensus in political news stories may be less overt than in advertising . . . but it is just as insidious” (p. 
77). In their case, consensus was constructed by the investigated media outlets to eliminate dividend and 
capital taxes. Accordingly, media outlets fail to report in a balanced assessment as “value frames 
emphasizing responsibility to others or to the social costs of inequality were rarely presented” (p. 77). In a 
similar vein, Bell and Entman (2011) argue that information is framed through an elite domination of 
policy debates, which, in their case, leads to a vague reporting on the dividend and capital taxes. 
 
                                                 
12 For sure, the early critical cultural studies also engaged with ideology and hegemony (i.e., Hall, Hobson, 
Lowe, & Willis, 1980). 
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Thinking of the five filters in Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) work, we have already tackled the 
economic filters, like ownership and advertising, but should not forget the ones on the political, hegemonic 
side. The one-sidedness of sources already came clear in the studies we analyzed—less so the ideological 
attitude (called flak on the one side, anticommunism on the other in the original book; today, probably to 
be replaced with antiterrorism). For our topic of economic inequality and redistributional policies, this 
would presumptively mean that certain ways of talking about economic inequality and—even more so—
redistributive policies to fight growing inequality are disregarded, marked as unrealistic or utopian, leaving 
it—once again—to the market, in its wonderful magic, to do the trick, seeing growing inequality only to be 
explained by meritocracy, thus, the best of just and fair worlds.  
 
Summing up, critical CPEoM assesses different ways of making sense of media power and 
influence, media convergence, and media bias. As highlighted before, many of the problems of the 
media that prompted critical political economy research remain salient, so when Hardy (2014, p. i) 
stresses that the “approach must continue to adapt to new conditions and challenges,” it is the fact of 
growing (economic) inequality that makes it worthwhile, even necessary to do so.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Recalling what happened a few years ago, many were concerned, even shocked, that the mass 
media did not provide their watchdog function before and during the outbreak of the crisis in 2007–08. It 
appeared as if this much-celebrated societal function of the media had failed or vanished; indeed, for 
some, the watchdog may be evolving into a lapdog (Preston, 2009; Starkman, 2014). A similar conclusion 
follows from the present article.  
 
Our review shows that news media coverage of inequality has increased somewhat over recent 
times, according to purely quantitative studies. The qualitative analysis reveals the one-sidedness of the 
reporting, the coverage being framed in an episodic rather than a thematic way. We cannot identify a 
diversity of information on economic inequality, but rather a bias toward individualistic explanations, and a 
neglect of the positive implications of redistributional policies to diminish inequality. Certainly, the media 
are too close to their “nonmultidimensional” sources and thus fail to give a critical account of economic 
developments.  
 
The political economy tradition offers rich theoretical approaches that we use to contextualize and 
understand current processes of the mediation of inequality. But we are also confronted with the fact that 
the topic of economic inequality and media coverage is not a well-researched theme. This lack of research 
is insofar pressing as the full range of economic inequality is not assessable through everyday life 
experiences. Mass media play an important role in mediating economic events, trends, and stories, but 
this research suggests that they are certainly not neutral with respect to the shaping of preferences 
concerning public policies intended to alter inequality. 
 
This article highlights the relative absence of in-depth analysis of media coverage on inequality 
and redistributional policies, as emphasized by 11 studies on those topics published since the year 2000. 
Clearly, there is scope for fruitful analyses for both scholars of (political) economy as well as media 
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scholars interested in the issue at stake. As a tentative perspective, we suggest that forthcoming analyses 
of economic inequality and its representation in the media at least needs to take some crucial questions 
into account: (1) What are the underlying real-world developments and structures (rising economic 
inequality of what kind)? (2) How is inequality constructed, by whom, and for what purpose? and (3) How 
does media reporting engage with redistributional policies and alternative socioeconomic options? 
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